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FREE, PRIOR, INFORMED CONSENT: THE KEY TO SELF-
DETERMINATION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE KICHWA
PEOPLE OF SARA YAKU V. ECUADOR
Carol Y Verbeek'
I. Introduction
By definition, indigenous people traditionally lived on, and claimed
possession of, the land now claimed by various states throughout the
world.' Despite their land claims, indigenous people have historically been
victimized by these states, often to the point where they are forcefully
evicted from the land traditionally occupied by their ancestors.2
Due to the history of abuse faced by native populations throughout the
world, international courts have increasingly dealt with human rights
violations affecting indigenous groups.3 One such organization is the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights ("Court"). The Court is located in San
Jose, Costa Rica and was established by the Organization of American
States ("OAS") in 1979 to interpret, uphold, and enforce the American
Convention on Human Rights ("Convention"). The Convention came into
force one year prior, in July 1978.6 The Court is autonomous and has
jurisdiction over cases in which specific states are accused of human rights
violations.7 In order for the Court to have jurisdiction over any specific
* Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law.
1. Fact Sheet, UNITED NATIONS PERMANENT FORUM ON INDIGENOUS ISSUES (May 15,
2006), http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/5session factsheetl.pdf.
2. See, e.g.,COLLEEN BRYANT & MATTHEW WILLIS, AUSTL. INST. OF CRIMINOLOGY,
RISK FACTORS IN INDIGENOUS VIOLENT VICTIMISATION (AIC Reports Technical &
Background Paper 30, 2008), available at http://www.aic.gov.au/documents/B/3/D/%7BB
3DAlCED-B75E-41BE-B7DB-738D9618E007%7DtbpO30.pdf.
3. See, e.g.IndexINTER-AM. CT. OF HUM. RTs., http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.cfin
(follow "English version" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 25, 2012) [hereinafter IACHR-Index].
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. History, INTER-AM. CT. OF HUM. RTs., http://www.corteidh.or.cr/historia.cfm
(follow "English version" hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 25, 2012) [hereinafter IACHR-
History].
7. See IACHR-Index, supra note 3.
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state, that state must have signed the Convention.' As of October 2011,
twenty-five states have adopted or ratified the Convention.9
In addition to hearing cases concerning human rights violations, the
Court also has jurisdiction to issue advisory opinions. These opinions
concern human rights issues brought by states that are parties to the
Convention or by other bodies within the OAS.' 0
Adjudicative cases can be brought before the Court by either an
individual member state, or, more commonly, by the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights ("Commission")." Citizens of member
states may not take a case directly to the Court.12 Instead, they must first
petition the Commission.' 3 The Commission then decides which cases are
appropriate to refer to the Court.14
Before referring a case to the Court, the Commission "must first declare
it admissible, conduct an investigation if necessary, explore possibilities for
a friendly settlement, and deliberate and prepare a report."'" Additionally,
the Commission must determine that no conflicting domestic proceedings
exist and that the case involves an issue not yet decided by the Court.'6
When a case first comes before the Commission, the Commission may first
issue a non-binding opinion without referring the matter to the Court. 7
Thereafter, the Commission has discretion to determine whether to refer the
matter to the Court, should the State fail to comply.' 8 Thus, access to the
8. See id.
9. IACHR-History, supra note 6. The following American states are parties to the
Convention: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Dominica,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Granada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay
and Venezuela. However, "Trinidad and Tobago denounced the American Convention on
Human Rights, by a communication addressed to the General Secretary of the OAS on May
26, 1998." Id. The United States has signed, but never ratified the Convention. Id.
10. Petitions and Consultations, INTER-AM. CT. OF HuM. RTs., http://www.corteidh.




14. See Randall S. Abate, Climate Change, the United States, and the Impacts of Arctic
Melting: A Case Study in the Need for Enforceable International Environmental Human
Rights, 26A STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 36-38 (2007).
15. Id. at 37-38.
16. Id. at 37.
17. Id. at 38.
18. See Francisco Forrest Martin, The International Human Rights & Ethical Aspects of
the Forum Non-Conveniens Doctrine, 35 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 101, 104 (2004).
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Court is limited to those states failing to comply with the Commission's
recommendations.
The Court's power has increased dramatically over the years due to the
quality of its jurisprudence and the increased adherence to its judgments.'9
Indeed, in the past few decades "there have been dozens of cases before
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights . . . in which [states have been
found] in violation of their international legal obligations with respect
to human rights. Of those many rulings, only a few states have refused or
been slow to comply with [the Court's] orders." 20 In recent years, non-
compliance has been the exception and compliance the norm, not only for
states found in violation of the Inter-American Court, but for states found in
violation of other regional or international human rights courts.2 1
Indeed, in at least one case, a state even complied with the Commission
prior to a final judgment issued by the Court.22 This indicates that the
judgments handed down by the Court may be becoming increasingly
important, not only to those parties involved, but to the development of
international norms.
The Court has established precedent on a number of important issues,
including that of free, prior, informed consent ("FPIC"). In a series of
cases, the Court established, in some instances, indigenous people have the
right to free and informed consent prior to states granting natural resources
concessions on their ancestral lands.23 The right to FPIC effectively
provides the indigenous populations with a veto power, without which they
would be unable to stop companies from extracting valuable resources from
their lands.
This case note will illustrate why FPIC, a right that is stipulated in the
Inter-American Convention, is fundamental to self-determination. This
note will explain the law as interpreted by the Court prior to its decision in
the case of the Kichwa People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador. It will show that
while the Court has recognized the right to FPIC in some cases, it has failed
19. See Morse Tan, Member State Compliance with the Judgments of the Inter-
American Court ofHuman Rights, 33 INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 319, 328 (2005).
20. Martin, supra note 18, at 102.
21. Id.; Tan, supra note 19, at 335-36.
22. Id. at 328.
23. These cases include: Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, (Aug. 12, 2008); Maya
Indigenous Cmtys. of the Toledo Dist. v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R.,
Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L./V/IL. 122, doc. 5 (2004); Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas
Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 79, T 173(4) (Aug. 31, 2001).
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to do so in others. This disparity has resulted in some indigenous
populations being unable to fully exercise their rights to control lands to
which they have legal title. Thus, while they may have legal title to the
lands, de facto control lies with the corporations who have been granted
concessions by the State.
This note will then utilize the Sarayaku case to illustrate why the right to
FPIC should apply equally to all state concessions. Without this right, the
states will continue to oppress indigenous populations within their borders.
The Court must recognize the right to FPIC with regard to all concessions.
If it fails to do so, it is effectively sanctioning state sponsored oppression of
indigenous populations.
II. Law Prior to the Sarayaku Case
Prior to 2001, no international tribunal had ruled a state had to recognize
and protect the communal property rights of indigenous peoples.24 In a
number of recent cases, however, the Commission held a state must first
consult, and at times even gain the consent, of the indigenous peoples. The
first indication of this shift in policy came when the Court issued a ruling in
the case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Community ofAwas Tingni v. Nicaragua.25
In the Awas Tingni case, the Nicaraguan government awarded a grant to
a Korean logging company to cut down trees in the land occupied by the
Awas Tingni.26 The grant permitted the logging company to exploit nearly
62,000 hectareS27 of the indigenous peoples' land. The government awarded
the grant without consulting the Awas Tingni and despite their strenuous
objections.28 The Nicaraguan government issued the grant even though the
"Nicaraguan Constitution recognize[d] the existence, culture, and
communal forms of land ownership of indigenous peoples including the
right to 'the use and enjoyment of the waters and forests on their communal
lands."'29 In 1997, the Nicaraguan Supreme Court ruled against the
24. See Anne Debevoise Ostby, Will Foreign Investors Regulate Indigenous Peoples'
Right to Self-Determination?, 21 Wis. INT'L L.J. 223, 232 (2003).
25. See id.
26. Claudio Grossman, Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A Landmark Case for the Inter-
American System, HuM. RTs. BREF, Spring 2001, at 1, 2.
27. Id. A hectare is approximately 2.47 acres.
28. Id.
29. Leonardo J. Alvarado, Prospects and Challenges in the Implementation of
Indigenous Peoples' Human Rights in International Law: Lessons from the Case ofAwas




government and held the lumber license should be voided pending
consultation with the indigenous peoples regarding any potential negative
effects on the environment.o
The Supreme Court further held regional officials, including members of
the Awas Tingni, must first consent to the project before the government
may issue a valid license to the lumber company.3' Nicaragua, however,
failed to comply with the Supreme Court's ruling and the case ultimately
reached the Inter-American Court.32 In 2001, the Court ruled in favor of the
Awas Tingni, ordering the Nicaraguan government to recognize the
property interests of the indigenous people and officially transfer title of the
land over to the Awas Tingni.33 The Court further ordered the government
to "abstain from any acts that might lead the agents of the State itself, or
third parties acting with its acquiescence or its tolerance, to affect the
existence, value, use or enjoyment of the property . . . " occupied by the
indigenous people.34 The Awas Tingni case served as an important
precedent for issues of consultation and FPIC in subsequent cases before
the Court.
In 2004, the Court clarified its holding in Awas Tingni when it addressed
a similar issue in the case of the Maya Indigenous Communities of the
Toledo District v. Belize.36 The Maya Indigenous Communities claimed the
State of Belize violated their rights when it permitted private logging
companies to exploit resources on their land. The Maya people claimed
they were not meaningfully consulted prior to the State's actions and that
they never agreed to such actions. The Commission issued a preliminary
finding:
POLITICA DE LA REPUBLICA DE NICARAGUA[CN.] tit. I, ch. I, art. 5 & tit. IV, ch. VI, art. 89,
LA GACETA, DIARIo OFICIAL [L.G.] 9 January 1987).
30. Grossman, supra note 26, at 2.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. See Alvarado, supra note 29, at 612-13.
34. Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, 173(4) (Aug. 31, 2001),
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_79 ing.pdf.
35. See Alvarado, supra note 29, at 614.
36. See Maya Indigenous Cmtys. of the Toledo Dist. v. Belize, Case 12.053, Inter-Am.
Comm'n H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.122, doc. 5 (2004), available at
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2004eng/belize.12053eng.htm.
37. Id. T 2.
38. Id.
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[O]ne of the "central elements to the protection of indigenous
property rights is the requirement that states undertake effective
and fully informed consultations with indigenous communities
regarding acts or decisions that may affect their traditional
territories," which would ensure that decisions or other actions
affecting indigenous property are "based upon a process of fully
informed consent on the part of the indigenous community as a
whole."39
Ultimately, the Court found in favor of the Maya people, holding they
did have a communal property right in the land.4 0 The Court further ruled
Belize should transfer legal title of the land to the Maya people and protect
their property rights.4 1 Furthermore, the Court also held Belize should
"abstain from any acts that might lead the agents of the State itself, or third
parties acting with its acquiescence or its tolerance, to affect the existence,
value, use or enjoyment of the property located in the geographic area
occupied and used by the Maya people."42 Finally, the Court recommended
the State receive FPIC from the indigenous people, requiring at a minimum
"that all of the members of the community are fully and accurately
informed of the nature and consequences of the process and provided with
an effective opportunity to participate individually or as collectives."
In 2007, the Court again issued a ruling in favor of indigenous
communities in The Saramaka People v. Suriname." The Saramaka case
seemed to retreat from the stringent holding in Maya Communities, which
required the State to obtain FPIC prior to making any concessions on
indigenous people's land. The Saramaka case involved logging and mining
concessions issued by the Government of Suriname on the lands of the
Saramaka people, but without their consent.4 5
The Saramaka People alleged that the granting of these concessions
interfered with their property rights, namely the use and enjoyment of their
39. Alvarado, supra note 29, at 614-15 (citing Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Maya
Indigenous Cmtys. of the Toledo Dist., 142).
40. Inter-Am. Comm'n. H.R., Maya Indigenous Cmlys of the Toledo Dist., 1 192-93.
41. Id. T 197(1).
42. Id.
43. Id. T 142.
44. See Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, (Aug. 12, 2008), available at http://www.






land and the natural resources of their communal property.46 In ruling
against the State, the Court found in order to avoid violating the Saramaka
People's property rights when issuing concessions within indigenous
territory, the State had to adhere to three safeguards. 47 First, the State was
required to ensure that the indigenous people had the ability to effectively
participate "in conformity with their customs and traditions, regarding any
development, investment, exploration or extraction plan . . . .,4 Second,
the State was required to ensure that the Saramaka would "reasonabl[y]
benefit" from the plan.49  Third, the State was required to issue an
environmental and social impact assessment before any concessions were
granted.50 As to FPIC, however, the Court noted such consent was only
needed when the concessions involved "large-scale development or
investment projects that would have a major impact" on the Saramaka
People's territory.51
Thus, in order for the FPIC requirement to be triggered, two prongs must
be met. First, the concessions must have a profound impact on the property
rights of indigenous peoples.52 Second, a large part of their territory must
be affected.5 3 Therefore, in its most recent case regarding FPIC, the Court
shirked away from its stringent requirement of consent. The Court instead
held that only consultation, not consent, is required. Consent would only be
required if the concessions would have a major impact on the indigenous
communities of the affected territory.
A. Right to Self-Determination
Self-determination is a fundamental principle underlying both the right
to property as well as the right to FPIC. In fact, "'self-determination is a
foundational principle of international law that bears particularly upon the
status and rights of . .. Native . .. people . . . in light of their history and
46. Marcos A. Orellana, International Decision, Saramaka People v. Suriname,
Judgment (Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs), Series C. No. 172, Inter-
American Court ofHuman Rights (Nov. 28, 2007), 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 841, 841 (2008).




51. Id. T 17.
52. Case of the Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits,
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contemporary conditions."' 54  Recognizing this, Article 1 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states all people have a
right to self-determination and can "freely pursue their economic, social,
and cultural development."" Article I further provides:
All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their
natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations
arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon
the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case
may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence. The
States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having
responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and
Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of
self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity
with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
Similarly, Article 4 of the U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples provides, "[i]ndigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-
determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters
relating to their internal and local affairs. . . ."5 A key aspect of a tribe's
right to self-determination is the ability to have control over communal
lands, including the resources and development of the land.
The principle of self-determination does not require statehood or an
independent government. Rather, it mandates that peoples have the
fundamental right to maintain their own lands, resources, governmental and
decision-making institutions, and cultures.59 Self-determination "consists
of nondiscrimination, cultural integrity, security of lands and natural
resources, entitlements of social welfare and development, and self-
government."60 The purpose of self-determination is to prevent a return to
54. Lorie M. Graham, Reparations, Self-Determination, and the Seventh Generation, 21
HARV. HuM. RTs. J. 47, 61 (2008) (citing S. James Anaya, The Native Hawaiian People and
International Human Rights Law: Toward a Remedy for Past and Continuing Wrongs, 28
GA. L. REv. 309, 330 (1994) [hereinafter Anaya, Native Hawaiian People]).
55. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC.
Doc. D, 95-2, 993 U.N.T.S. 2.
56. Id.
57. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples art. 4, G.A. Res.
61/295, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007).
58. Ostby, supra note 24, at 234-35.
59. Graham, supra note 54, at 65.




colonial days,' where strong imperial powers exploited the people and
resources of the lands they conquered.
The U.N. Declaration further puts an affirmative human rights duty on
the state to protect indigenous peoples' right to self-determination.6 2
Therefore, if an indigenous group has suffered a violation of this right, the
state has "a duty to provide an adequate remedy."63 States must put in place
mechanisms to prevent and address the following:
(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of
their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or
ethnic identities; (b) Any action which has the aim or effect of
dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources; (c)
Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or
effect of violating or undermining any of their rights; (d) Any
form of forced assimilation or integration; (e) Any form of
propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic
discrimination directed against them.64
Self-determination, therefore, "acts as a tool for indigenous peoples to
'diminish their vulnerability in the face of powerful majority or elite
interests and to enhance the responsiveness of government to the unique
interests of indigenous communities and their members."' 65  In order for
states to recognize and uphold the rights of indigenous peoples, the
indigenous communities must be afforded their right to property and FPIC
prior to the state making any concessions involving indigenous lands.
B. Right to Property
Real property rights are of great importance to indigenous communities
throughout the world.66 Land provides food, income, and support for
indigenous peoples. For indigenous communities, land represents more
than a means of survival. It also provides a basis for the spiritual and
61. Id. at 233-34 (citing S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
110 (1996)).
62. Graham, supra note 54, at 76.
63. Anaya, Native Hawaiian People, supra note 54, at 360-61.
64. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 57, at
art. 8(2).
65. Ostby, supra note 24, at 235 (citing ANAYA, supra note 61, at 111.
66. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 57.
67. See id. at 44.
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cultural identities of the people who occupy it.68 Indigenous communities
often occupy their land for many centuries. Thus, their "ancestral lands,
which contain the sacred sites where generations of ancestors have
worshiped, are essential to the transmission of their culture and beliefs to
future generations. In short, their traditional lands embody their legacy to
the future."69 It is for this reason that the International Labor Organization
Convention 169 mandates that states respect the spiritual and cultural
importance of indigenous peoples' land.70
Both the United Nations and the Inter-American System, which were
established by the Organization of American States, have recognized the
right of indigenous people to property.71 Article 25 of the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People ("U.N. Declaration") states,
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen
their distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally
owned or otherwise occupied and used lands, territories, waters
and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their
responsibilities to future generations in this regard.72
Article 26 of the U.N. Declaration grants indigenous people the "right to
the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned,
occupied or otherwise used or acquired."
The OAS has taken similar measures to protect indigenous land rights.
In 1948, the OAS General Assembly adopted Article 39 of the Inter-
American Charter of Social Guarantees, which requires "states in the Inter-
American system to take 'necessary measures' to protect indigenous
peoples' lives and property, 'defending them from extermination, sheltering
them from oppression and exploitation.' 74  Likewise, Article 21 of the
68. Jo M. Pasqualucci, International Indigenous Land Rights: A Critique of the
Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Light of the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights ofIndigenous Peoples, 27 Wis. INT'L L.J. 51, 56 (2009).
69. Id. at 56-57.
70. International Labour Organisation Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples in Independent Countries, art. 13(1), June 27, 1989, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383.
71. Pasqualucci, supra note 68, at 52.
72. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 57, art.
25.
73. Id. at art. 26(1).
74. S. James Anaya & Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Protection of Indigenous Peoples'
Rights over Lands and Natural Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System,
14 HARv. HUM. RTs. J. 33, 33 (2001) (citing Inter-American Charter of Social Guaranties
272 [ Vol. 37
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American Convention of Human Rights provides, "[e]veryone has the right
to the use and enjoyment of his property." 75 Article 23 of the American
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man confirms "the right of every
person 'to own such private property as meets the essential needs of decent
living and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and the home."'
7 6
In 2001, as part of the Awas Tingni case, the Court for the first time
recognized the communal property rights of indigenous people and held the
State had a duty to protect those rights.77 Thus, both the U.N. and OAS
have acknowledged that indigenous people have property rights that are
derived either from traditional occupation or by a state grant of the land.
III. Statement of the Sarayaku Case
On May 12, 1992, the Ecuadorian government awarded title of a single
parcel of land (approximately 254,652 hectares) to a number of indigenous
communities along the Bobonaza River, including the Kichwa People of
Sarayaku. 79 The purpose of the grant was to "protect the ecosystems of the
Ecuadorian Amazon basin, to improve the living standards of the
indigenous communities, and to preserve the integrity of their culture. 8s
While this land was awarded to indigenous tribes, the Ecuadorian State
reserved the "subsoil natural resources" for itself and declared that it could
art. 39 (1948), reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 432, 433 (Edmund Jan Osmanczyk ed., 1990)).
75. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 3;
1144 U.N.T.S. 123, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-21, 9 I.L.M. 99 (1969) (entered into force July
18, 1978).
76. Anaya & Williams, supra note 74, at 42 (citing American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man, Res. XXX, Final Act of the Ninth International Conference of American
states (Pan-American Union), Bogota, Colombia, Mar. 30-May 2, 1948, art. XXIII,
reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING To HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM 17, OEA/Ser. LN/II.82 Rev. 1 (1992)).
77. See Alvarado, supra note 29, at 609.
78. See Anaya & Williams, supra note 74, at 41-43.
79. Application Filed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights Against the Republic of Ecuador, 59 (Apr. 29,
2010), Kichwa People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Case 12.465, Inter-Am. Comm'n
H.R.,http://www.cidh.oas.org/demandas/12.465%2Sarayaku%2Ecuador/ 2026abr
20 10%
20ENG.pdf [hereinafter IACHR Application] (citing Property Records for Puyo, Pastaza,
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"exploit them without interference so long as the rules of environmental
protection [were] observed." 8 '
Four years later, Ecuador signed a hydrocarbon and crude oil exploration
contract with a private Argentinean oil company, Compahia General de
Combustibles ("CGC").82 The area designated in the contract was block
No. 23 of the Amazonian Region and it covered approximately 200,000
hectares. Block No. 23 included the land granted to the indigenous
communities, including the Kichwa People.8 4 In fact, 65% of block No. 23
contained ancestral lands legally belonging to the Kichwa People of
Sarayaku.8 According to the Kichwa People, CGC conducted seismic
exploration without their consent in 2002 and 2003. The Kichwa claim this
exploration greatly disturbed their quality of life, while at the same time
disrupting the environment that the 1992 land grant sought to protect.86
Prior to beginning the exploration, CGC was required to prepare an
Environmental Impact Assessment ("EIA") as well as perform "all efforts
necessary to preserve the ecological balance" within block No. 23.
Additionally, CGC was required to obtain the consent of the indigenous
people that resided in the region.88 However, none of these requirements
were met. According to the Application filed by the Commission, the CGC
failed to complete the EIA altogether.8 9  Further, after unsuccessful
negotiations with the Kichwa People, the oil company ultimately forced
consent. The company obtained a medical caravan and demanded that, "in
order to be treated, the individual had to sign a list, which was allegedly
later converted into a letter [of consent]."9o
In late 2002 and early 2003, as part of the exploration, CGC used a total
of 1,433 kilograms of explosives and left them on the portion of block No.
23 occupied by the Kichwa People.9' During this period, CGC's activities
allegedly disrupted the Kichwa People so substantially that they declared a





86. Mario Melo, Sarayaku: An Emblematic Case of Territorial Defense, AMAZON
WATCH (Sept. 12, 2011), http://amazonwatch.org/news/2011/0623-sarayaku-an-emblematic-
case-of-territorial-defense.
87. IACHR Application, supra note 79, paras. 65-68.
88. Id. at paras. 65-70.
89. Id. at para. 68.
90. Id. at para. 70.




state of emergency within their territory.92 According to the Commission's
Application, the Kichwa People's daily lives were brought to a halt,
resulting in, inter alia, the suspension of schools.9 3 Also, the Kichwa
People were forced to retreat into the forest because of the land mines used
in seismic exploration, resulting in the People not having access to their
crops and other food sources for a period of approximately three months.94
Further, in order to facilitate CGC's activities, the State of Ecuador ordered
a military presence in block No. 23.9' This caused a series of assaults
between the Kichwa and the military.9 6
In 2003, the Kichwa People requested the Commission intervene to stop
CGC's state-sponsored activities. Since Ecuador is a party to the
American Convention, the Commission had jurisdiction to hear the case.
The Kichwa People alleged Ecuador violated their right to protect their
property and the relationship they have with their land, their right to prior
consultation and consent, their right to life, their right to freedom of
movement, their right to human treatment, and their right to due process
and judicial protection." Although the Commission issued precautionary
measures to protect the Kichwa People from further violation of their rights,
the Ecuadorean government failed to comply with the measures in any
meaningful way.99
A year later in July of 2004, the Inter-American Court also issued
provisional measures to protect the life, property, and freedom of
movement of the Kichwa People.'00 The Ecuadorean state refused to
comply. Again, in June 2005, the Court dictated measures favoring the
Kichwa People.' 0 ' These additional measures, which are still in force,
called for the removal of explosives from the portion of block No. 23.102
This time, the Ecuadorean government did take some steps to comply with
the Court's directives; however, these efforts were minimal at best. By
December 2009, only fourteen kilograms of explosives had been removed
92. Id. at para. 79.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at para. 80.
96. Id. at para. 81.
97. Melo, supra note 86.
98. See IACHR Application, supra note 79, at para 1.
99. Melo, supra note 86.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. IACHR Application, supra note 79, at para. 43.
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from the Sarayaku territory.103 The process has since then been
suspended.1
On April 26, 2010, the Commission filed an application on behalf of the
Kichwa People of Sarayaku against the Republic of Ecuador.'0 5 The Court
held hearings in San Jos6, Costa Rica, in early July 2011. On July 25,
2012, the Court finally issued a ruling ending the decade long struggle of
the Kichwa People.106 Although the Court did not go so far as to say that
the right to FPIC was absolute, the Court required meaningful consultation,
with the goal of acquiring the consent of all parties involved.'07 Indeed, the
Court's decision "establishes in detail how consultation should be
undertaken: in good faith, through culturally appropriate procedures that are
aimed at reaching consent. Thus, exploration or extraction of natural
resources cannot be done at the expense of an indigenous community's
means of physical or cultural survival on their own land." 08
IV International Authorities Versus the Court
Most international authorities generally agree that indigenous
communities must be consulted prior to granting concessions that might
affect the use or enjoyment of the indigenous peoples' communal
property.109 According to the International Labor Organization, the
consultation "must be in good faith, through culturally appropriate
procedures, and with the objective of reaching an agreement with the
affected indigenous peoples.""o Similarly, the U.N. Human Rights
Committee has held the state has an affirmative duty of consultation, and
103. Melo, supra note 86.
104. Id.
105. IACHR Application, supra note 79.
106. Ecuador: Inter-American Court Ruling Marks Key Victory for Indigenous Peoples,




109. Pasqualucci, supra note 68, at 86.
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About Natural Resource Extraction: The More Fundamental Issue of What Rights
Indigenous Peoples Have in Land and Resources, 22 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 7, 11 (2005)
(citing Report of the Committee Set Up to Examine the Representation Alleging Non-
Observance by Ecuador of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169),
Made Under Article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the Confederacion Ecuatoriana de




must protect the cultural interest of indigenous peoples."' The World Bank
likewise refuses to finance projects unless the "states engage in 'free, prior,
informed consultation' with the indigenous people whose interests would
be affected."' 1 2 However, the World Bank expressly specified that, while
consultation is required, consent is not, and the consultation does not result
in a veto power for indigenous communities." 3
By contrast, the U.N. requires indigenous people have the right to FPIC,
in addition to prior consultation.1 4 According to Article 32 of the U.N.
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples,
Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop
priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands
or territories and other resources . . . States shall consult and
cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned
through their own representative institutions in order to obtain
their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any
project affecting their lands or territories and other
resources ... .s
The U.N. therefore explicitly recognizes the right of indigenous people
to FPIC with regard to any concessions that would modify or affect
indigenous peoples' use, enjoyment, or ownership of land."'6  The Inter-
American Court, however, has not followed the U.N.'s approach.
Instead, the Court has taken a middle ground approach between the right
of prior consultation and the right of FPIC in all cases. The Court's
position has been that prior consultation is always required, while prior
consent is mandated only in projects involving large-scale development that
would have a "major impact" on the indigenous peoples' property
interests." 7 Further, in order to qualify as a "major impact" project, the
111. See id. at 12.
112. Pasqualucci, supra note 68, at 87 (citing OP 4.10 - Indigenous Peoples, WORLD
BANK OPERATIONAL MANUAL, para. 1 (July 2005), http://go.worldbank.org/TE769PDW
NO).
113. Id.
114. United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 57, at
art. 32(1)-(2).
115. Id. (emphasis added).
116. Id. at art. 26.
117. See Pasqualucci, supra note 68, at 90 (citing Case of the Saramaka People v.
Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, 1
134 (Aug. 12, 2008), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_185
_ing.pdf).
277No. 1]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
concessions must involve a large portion of the territory owned or occupied
by the indigenous peoples."' 8 But full protection of property rights should
not depend on the amount of land involved. The underlying principle of
self-determination of indigenous peoples should govern the Court's
decision-making process. The Court must recognize the right to FPIC in all
cases, no matter the concession size.
V The Inter-American Court Decision in Sarayaku
The Sarayaku case was before the Court for consideration in July of
2011. Many were hopeful that the Court would issue a decision granting a
right of FPIC to indigenous people in concession cases of all types.
Although the Court did go further than its previous decisions by not only
requiring free, prior informed consultation, but consultation aimed at
reaching a consensus, it did not go as far as to establish an absolute right to
FPIC in all cases."'9 The Court did, however, emphasize the consultation
process must take place in good faith and according to international
standards. 12 0 Thus, as stated by Fernanda Doz Costa, "Consultations cannot
simply consist of sharing decisions that have already been made. Instead,
Ecuador needs to make a real effort to establish an open and honest
dialogue, based on mutual trust and respect and with the aim of reaching a
consensus."l21
But it was not enough to simply establish a right to free, prior informed
consultation, or even to set guidelines for how that consultation process
should take place. Instead, it is vital the Court confirm indigenous peoples
have a right to FPIC in all cases. Until such time, indigenous people will
continue to be kept from fully exercising their right to self-determination, as
the Court will have to repeatedly determine whether a concession is "large"
enough to warrant a right to FPIC.
By continuing to maintain an ad hoc standard for FPIC, indigenous
people like the Sarayaku will be forced to bring their cases to court and wait
for as long as a decade before their rights can be established. Thus, the
118. See Pasqualucci, supra note 68, at 90.
119. Press Release, Josd Gualinga, President of Sarayaku, Sarayaku Press Statement on
Inter-American Court Sentence (July 25, 2012), available at http://amazonwatch.org/news/
2012/0725-sarayaku-press-statement-on-inter-american-court-sentence.
120. Press Release, Amnesty International, Inter-American Court Ruling in Favor of







Court must be willing to recognize a right to FPIC in all concessions, no
matter the size. The Court's case-by-case analysis is detrimental to
indigenous people. When the crux of the right to FPIC depends on the size
of land concessions, smaller concessions allow states to get away with
exploitation.
Further, the right to own property means little without both the right of
consultation and the right of FPIC. In order for property and ownership
rights to be meaningful, the indigenous communities must also have the
right to be informed of concessions that may affect the use or enjoyment of
the land. The Court should implement a bright-line rule and require
indigenous people receive informed consent prior to any concessions.
While the U.N. has recognized the right to FPIC when any project is
undertaken on indigenous lands, the Court has only recognized the right in
limited circumstances. Until the Court grants a blanket rule giving FPIC to
indigenous people in all cases, the communal property rights of the state
cannot be fully protected.
A. Right to FPIC
Although the Court has recognized the right to self-determination with
respect to property rights and the right to FPIC in the Awas Tingni case, it
has not gone far enough. In the cases of smaller concessions, consultation
without consent has been deemed sufficient.12 2 FPIC must be given in all
cases because the fundamental right of self-determination includes the
rights of people to choose how their land will be used. 123
States within the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court are now
required to grant indigenous communities title to their traditionally
occupied communal lands124 Despite this, the rights of indigenous people
remain uncertain, and states continue to run rough-shod over the rights of
indigenous communities by repeatedly granting concessions to foreign
companies to extract resources.125  This exploitation often results in
violence and intimidation of the land's inhabitants, and often occurs in spite
of the protests by the indigenous populations.126
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See Pasqualucci, supra note 68, at 61 (citing Sawboyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v.
Paraguay 2006 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser C.) No. 146, 1 128).
125. Id. at 59; Ostby, supra note 24, at 247.
126. Pasqualucci, supra note 68, at 59.
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B. Free, Prior, Informed Consultation
How are states able to get away with exploitation if the Court requires, at
the very minimum, free and informed consultation prior to such
concessions? As opposed to FPIC, free, prior, informed consultation
includes consultation "in good faith, through culturally appropriate
procedures, and with the objective of reaching an agreement with the
affected indigenous peoples."l2 7 Many states skirt this requirement by
failing to oversee the consultation process between the foreign companies
and the indigenous communities.
The Sarayaku case is a prime example: a foreign oil company, CGC,
used devious methods to satisfy the consultation requirement. 12 8 After a
period of unsuccessful negotiations with the Sarayaku, CGC ultimately
obtained a medical caravan and demanded that, "in order to be treated, the
individual had to sign a list, which was allegedly later converted into
[evidence of consultation]."l29
Another example of skirting the consultation requirement took place in
the case of the Embera Katio people of Colombia. The Colombian
government first obtained consent of the people and subsequently made
modifications to the plans for concessions. 130 Fortunately, the consultation
was found to be ineffective and contrary to the Convention because the
Embera Katio people were never consulted about the subsequent
modifications.' 3 1
States and private companies avoid the requirements of free, prior
informed consultation through means of deceit. Even if the private
companies did consult with the indigenous communities, consultation is
meaningless when the indigenous communities lack a veto power. The lack
of veto power goes against indigenous communities' fundamental right to
self-determination.
The Court has held that while prior consultation is always required, prior
consent is only mandated for projects involving large-scale development
projects having a "major impact" on the property interests of indigenous
127. Anaya, supra note 110, at 11.
128. See generally IACHR Application, supra note 79, at para 70.
129. Id.
130. Anaya, supra note 110, at 11 (citing Report of the Committee Set Up to Examine
the Representation Alleging Non-Observance of Colombia of the Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), Made Under Article 24 of the ILO Constitution by the
Central Unitary Workers' Union (CUT) and the Colombian Medical Trade Union





peoples.13 2 In order for a project or concession to have a "major impact," it
must involve a large portion of the territory owned or occupied by the
indigenous peoples. 3 3
While consent for large-scale projects is certainly a step in the right
direction, it is not enough to protect the indigenous communities' right to
self-determination. First, the Court has yet to define what constitutes a
"large portion" of territory. The concession in the case of the Kichwa
People involved an area of 200,000 hectares, 65% of which was occupied
by the Kichwa People 3 4 while the Awas Tingni case involved only a
concession of 62,000 hectares.
Second, the Court fails to consider the value of the land in its analysis.
Smaller concessions may be of higher value due to the amount of resources
on the concessions or the great spiritual value to the indigenous people. By
taking only the quantity of land into account, the Court has not considered
the quality of the land, both of which have a great impact.
Third, the Court ignores the impact the private companies have on the
indigenous communities when they are working on or near indigenous
lands. The Kichwa People were allegedly so disrupted by CGC's activities,
that a state of emergency was declared on the Sarayaku territory.s3 5 The
disruptions caused by CGC, as well as the increased military presence,
brought the Kichwa People's daily lives to a halt. Schools were suspended,
crops were depleted, and the Kichwa People were forced to retreat into the
jungle to survive.136 The Court has failed to uphold self-determination
because it does not take the above factors into account.
VI. Conclusion
The right to FPIC is necessary to preserve both the right to property as
well as the right to self-determination. The Sarayaku case should have
been the Court's opportunity to hand down a decision departing from its
prior precedent. The Court should have held that the concession involved in
the Sarayaku case was significant enough to warrant the right to FPIC.
Instead, it held indigenous people only have an absolute right to free, prior
informed consultation, not consent. Although the Court went further to
mandate that such consultation must comply with international standards
132. See Pasqualucci, supra note 68, at 90.
133. See id. at 91.
134. IACHR Application, supra note 79, at para. 63.
135. Id. at para. 79.
136. Id.
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and be accomplished with an aim towards reaching consent, this will not
result in adequate protection for indigenous populations in the Inter-
American system.
Until the Court finds the right to FPIC is indeed fundamental and should
be applied to all concessions, it will continue to endorse states' oppression
of the rights of indigenous people. By continuing to analyze state
concessions on a case-by-case basis, states in the Inter-American system
will continue to override indigenous rights to property and self-
determination. A bright-line rule was needed, but the Court did not supply
it.
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